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Abstract—Human performance is a key component to the safe 
operation of nuclear power plants. Further, human performance 
is quite variable, and while some variability may be random, 
much of it may be attributed to factors that are difficult to assess.  
There is a need to identify and assess aspects of human 
performance that relate to plant safety and to develop measures 
that can be used to successfully assess human performance for 
purposes of research that can lead to technical basis for 
developing human factors review criteria. 
I. INTRODUCTION
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) sponsored 
research [1] and various nuclear industry groups and 
associations [2] have recognized that human performance is a 
key component in the safe operation of nuclear power plants, 
and the NRC has designated it as a crosscutting element of the 
Reactor Oversight Process (ROP).  Variability in human 
performance occurs from day to day, across activities, which 
vary in complexity, workgroups, and across plants, 
contributing to the uncertainty in the outcomes of plant 
performance.  Some of this variability may be random, though 
much of the variability may be attributed to factors that can be 
monitored directly.  There is a need to identify and assess 
aspects of human performance that relate to plant safety and to 
develop measures that can be used to develop technical bases 
for the development of human factors review guidance. 
The objective of this paper is to describe an approach for 
establishing a technical basis from which human performance 
measures could be developed.  First, an analysis of historical 
data is presented that provides evidence of a connection 
between human performance and overall plant performance.  
Second, a review of potential measures derived from industry 
models of human performance and processes in nuclear power 
plants is presented.  Third, a modeling and simulation approach 
is proposed which demonstrates the relationship between human 
and plant performance. 
II. STUDIES CONNECTING HUMAN AND PLANT
PERFORMANCE 
As one of the initial steps to establishing a technical basis for 
human performance measures, an empirical analysis of human 
performance and nuclear plant performance data available to the 
NRC was performed.  The data for this analysis came from two 
sources.  The human performance data was obtained from the 
NRC’s Human Factors Information System (HFIS).  HFIS is a 
database that provides a general overview of the types and 
approximate numbers of human performance issues 
documented by either the NRC or licensees.  Plant performance 
data were the PIs for the cornerstones of the ROP.  The HFIS 
data used in the analysis were the number of human 
performance related “hits” or causal factors extracted from 
NRC Inspection Reports (IRs) and Licensee Event Reports 
(LERs).  These data were available for the years 2000 through 
2004.  Three ROP Performance Indicators (PIs) were used in 
the analysis: unplanned scrams per 7,000 critical hours, 
unplanned power changes per 7,000 critical hours, and safety 
system unavailability.  These are referred to as initiating events 
#1 and #3, and mitigating systems #1 respectively, which 
corresponds to how they are listed in [3].  The initial results 
showed that human performance is statistically significantly 
related to a plant’s safety performance.  For example, the 
probability of safety system unavailability was 5 times higher 
for plants that had a “high” number of HFIS hits the previous 
year.  More details about this analysis can be found in [4]. 
The general conclusion from this analysis of existing data is 
that there is, in fact, empirical support showing human 
performance is related to and affects overall plant performance.  
The analysis shows that as human performance degrades at 
nuclear power plants, the likelihood increases that plant 
performance is also degrading.  These results are corroborated 
by past research [1], which studied the direct contributions of 
human performance to risk in significant operating events at 
commercial nuclear power plants.  The NRC Accident 
Sequence Precursor (ASP) Program and the Human 
Performance Events Database (HPED) were used to identify 
safety significant events in which human performance 
contributed to changes in risk.  The sensitivity analyses 
performed using these data showed that human performance 
was a major contributor to analyzed events.  Two hundred and 
seventy human errors were identified in the events reviewed and 
multiple human errors were involved in every event.  Latent 
failures (i.e., errors committed prior to the event whose effects 
are not discovered until an event occurs) were present four 
times more often than were active errors (i.e., those occurring at 
or following event initiation).  The latent errors included 
failures to correct known problems and errors committed during 
design, maintenance, and operations activities.  Based on both 
of these findings, there is evidence that indicates a connection 
between human performance and plant outcomes. 
III. INDUSTRY FRAMEWORKS AND HUMAN
PERFORMANCE PROGRAMS 
Various nuclear industry groups and associations, such as the 
Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), the Electric 
Power Research Institute (EPRI), and the Nuclear Energy 
Institute (NEI) have written guidance documents on human 
performance and work processes in nuclear power plants.  
These reports have been written in part to support ongoing 
efforts to provide practical tools for performance improvement 
(e.g., measures of human performance).  One document jointly 
written by NEI, EPRI, and INPO [2] could serve as a starting 
point for a framework to develop an approach to measuring 
human performance.  For example, the “the human performance 
process map” in this document has the potential to be an 
excellent starting point because it provides an integrated 
framework of organizational factors and performance 
improvement, and because it explicitly shows how 
organizational factors can contribute to a variety of human 
errors in the workplace.  Specifically, the human performance 
process map shows the actions and resource inputs needed to 
achieve the desired outputs.  This process map can be used as a 
framework in a modeling and simulation approach because it 
has the basic input and output elements for nuclear power plants 
already mapped out.  With an accepted and representative 
framework developed by the nuclear industry in place, the issue 
of model validity for this modeling and simulation approach to 
develop human performance measures is addressed. 
In addition, a number of individual utilities, under their own 
initiative, have created a variety of in-house programs and 
efforts to track and trend human performance.  These programs 
are based on guidance documents created by industry 
organizations based on research by Reason [5].  These programs 
could provide their data as one of the input sources for the 
modeling and simulation approach being proposed to develop 
human performance measures.  In particular, a number of 
individuals from a variety of nuclear power plants in the US 
have shared their human performance measurement programs to 
the NRC, and in some instances given data from their program 
for use by the NRC and this research effort.  As the modeling 
and simulation approach continues to develop, it is anticipated 
that these data could provide valuable input and possibly 
validate the approach. 
IV. HUMAN PERFORMANCE MODELING AND
SIMULATION 
It is acknowledged that the impact of human performance on 
nuclear power plant safety and operations is very important, but 
it is also difficult to ascertain.  The difficulty arises from the 
complexity of nuclear plant operations and the many pathways 
by which human performance can affect operations.  Regulators 
want to be assured that a plant is operating safely.  This means 
that the physical system must be adequately designed, operated, 
and maintained.  What the regulators might also use is some 
means of knowing that the managerial and organizational 
system is also adequately designed, operated and maintained. 
This latter issue is where modeling can be very useful. 
The difficulty is that operators of a nuclear power plant 
cannot address human performance issues experimentally.  For 
example, senior management cannot create a new reward 
system to encourage changed behavior in the operations or 
maintenance staff and quickly discover whether or not the 
change is working.  It would take years to decide if a new policy 
is producing desired results.  Indeed, even knowing what to 
measure to ascertain if the performance is improving is difficult.  
Complicating matters is the complexity of operations systems 
and the fact that changes may propagate in very diffuse ways. 
This difficulty is what gives modeling and simulation 
approaches their great power and usefulness.  If one can 
adequately represent the system in a model then system 
performance can be assessed by multiple simulations.  The 
impacts of various proposed new policies, be they managerial or 
regulatory, can be analyzed, studied, and assessed.  It is the 
rapid, quantitative, nondestructive testing of policy options that 
makes models so useful. 
The key issue is to find a means of constructing a model that 
adequately represents the real system being modeled.  While 
this issue is partially addressed with the use of the human 
performance process map described in [2], other possible issues 
and approaches are also considered.  Another issue in this 
approach is to show how its representation of the real system, 
(i.e., the system’s behaviors, how changes in the system 
produce different outcomes, etc.) can provide useful 
information to decision-makers (e.g., regulators).  Modeling can 
help inform regulatory assessments by showing how interrelated 
plant outcomes such as safety, productivity, and quality can be 
associated with human performance.  While human 
performance only partially explains plant outcomes, the 
association, even if non-linear, is consistent and predictable.  In 
what follows, a possible modeling and simulation approach is 
outlined that makes explicit the relations between the plant 
organizational structure, the nature of the work done in different 
sectors of the organization, and the performance of the 
workforce that accomplishes the work.  This approach is based 
on modeling and simulation work developed by HGK 
Associates [6], which is complimentary to the efforts to use 
industry developed and accepted frameworks and process maps 
[2].  The purpose of this section is to present in more detail an 
initial representation, or model, of the effort to incorporate 
human performance into overall performance at nuclear power 
plants.  Two basic models (for plant management and 
maintenance department) are described below with a particular 
emphasis placed on how human performance issues can be 
incorporated.
Model development begins by identifying the set of activities 
within the plant and how these activities are conducted.  It is 
convenient to distinguish activities according to the different 
components of the organization.  A typical organization chart 
for a nuclear power plant is shown in Fig. 1.  Only those sectors 
of the organization that are important to safety are included, and 
other sectors and functions such as personnel, payroll, and 
accounting are omitted. 
Figure 1. Typical Nuclear Power Plant Organizational Structure 
The key to creating a model is to identify what types of work 
occurs in a sector, and what types of personnel carry out the 
work (i.e., the work process).  Also, the policies that guide 
allocation of resources to various tasks must be identified.  The 
maintenance sector is discussed in detail. 
Mainenance Sector 
The maintenance sector is complex in terms of the quantity 
and nature of the work to be done, and in the composition of the 
workforce.  The workforce is usually composed of: sector 
management, management support staff, craft supervisors, craft 
labor, and craft support personnel.  The different types of 
workers carry out different types of work.  Craft labor work is 
illustrated.  The work types for the crafts include: inspection 
work, corrective work, preventative maintenance, and quick fix 
work.  The overall flow of work is shown in Fig. 2. 
Note that the breakdown of operations contains flows of 
materials in the form of rates. These rates enter and leave in 
quantities that obey a conservation principle. That is, 
 Content  (t+dt) = 
 Content  (t) + (Flow rate in – Flow rate out) * dt 
In Fig. 2, the workforce is a conserved quantity.  Flows into 
and out of the manpower levels are not shown explicitly.  
Moreover, there is a separate flow for each type of work done 
within a sector. 
The work generation rate is different for each type of work.  
Usually there is a steady component and a time varying 
component that depends upon plant conditions.  For example, 
preventative maintenance work is usually on a long-term 
schedule that changes with plant conditions and/or sector 
management decisions.  On the other hand, inspections are 
usually mandated and cannot be slipped easily. 
The manpower level and craft productivity determines the 
work accomplishment rate.  Maintenance staff productivity can 
be represented as a function of many factors such as: skill level, 
experience, training, supervisor availability, tools available, 
spare parts inventory, procedure quality, planning quality, and 
motivation.  Note that motivation is a composite of several 
factors including the corporate reward system, the work 
environment, and growth prospects.  Obtaining information on 
all of these factors is a key issue in model development.  
Working with plant managers it is possible to acquire data to 
help quantify such matters.  In general, the productivity of craft 
personnel is represented as a multiplicative factor such as:  
 P(t) = P0*f1(t) * f2(t) * * * fn(t) 
where P0 is the nominal productivity and the fk (k = 1, 2,…, n) 
are dimensionless multipliers on the base number.  Thus, a 
workforce composed of all journeymen would have a maximum 
skill multiplier whereas a workforce composed of all 
apprentices would have a minimum skill multiplier. 
All of the multipliers are time dependent and can change with 
many conditions.  The overall staff skill level is a weighted 
composite of the skill of the total craft labor staff.  As time goes 
on the experience level improves and apprentices migrate into 
the journeyman pool.  One of the most rapidly varying factors is 
the supervisor availability.  If conditions in the plant become 
abnormal, the supervisors may spend too much time in meetings 
and insufficient time with the workers reviewing work products, 
planning and scheduling work, and maintaining worker 
motivation. 
Also note that not all of the work will be done correctly the 
first time.  Thus, a quality factor is included that is a 
dimensionless quantity and represents the fraction of the work 
done correctly the first time.  The quality of craftwork is 
represented in a similar fashion.  That is, 
 Q(t) = Q0*q1(t) * q2(t) * * * qn(t) 
The modulating factors could be the same as for productivity, 
or different depending upon the beliefs of the plant operators. 
Figure 2. Maintenance Work Flow 
All of the other sectors can be represented in a similar manner.  
That is, the sector work is broken down into its various parts 
and the creation and completion rates are analyzed.  The work is 
done by a multi-component workforce whose individual 
performance characteristics are represented by productivities 
and work qualities. 
It should also be noted that the sectors do not operate in 
isolation.  The model must incorporate interactions in the form 
of collaborative work.  Thus, the preparation and scheduling of 
a corrective work order will involve joint work between 
maintenance, operations, engineering, and possibly licensing.  
The degree to which coordination is done properly will impact 
both the productivity and quality of the repair.  Staff is assigned 
to coordination work from all the involved sectors.  Any sector 
that fails to assign adequate staff puts all the other sectors at risk 
of reduced performance. 
A. Developing Model Parameters 
Many of the variables in a model are easy to represent.  For 
example, manpower levels can be obtained from historic 
records.  Each sector has records that can be used to create a 
picture of the distribution of manpower throughout the system.  
Similarly, the flow of most types of work can be obtained from 
existing sector records.  Given the time dependent values of 
work levels and schedules, it is usually easy to find the flow 
rates into and out of inventories.  However, some generation 
rates will have to be obtained indirectly.  For example, the 
amount of coordination work for a work order may have to be 
obtained by averaging over many examples. 
Obtaining data on the factors that influence productivity and 
quality is much more complex than workflow data.  Much of 
the data will have to be inferred from real experience.  Thus, if 
plants have data on work output as a function of time, it may be 
possible to relate changes in productivity to other conditions in 
the plant.  The most likely pathway to obtaining the factors is by 
interviews with plant staff and management via a Delphic 
process.  Experience with models suggests that certain factors 
will emerge as the most significant factors in overall 
performance and one can concentrate extra effort on 
representing these factors. 
B. Safety Benefits from Modeling and Simulation 
The fundamental purpose for creating a model such as this is 
to help decision makers, whether they are regulators or the 
plant’s management, understand how human performance can 
improve, or threaten, safe operation of a nuclear power plant.  
For example, a key concern regarding plant safety is the 
availability of safety systems.  A decrease in availability could 
be a reflection of wear and tear in equipment, which is easily 
recognized.  More subtle is a decrease in availability due to poor 
human performance in service and maintenance activities, or in 
surveillance and test activities.  These deficiencies in turn may 
relate to a host of sources such as poor scheduling and 
coordination, inadequate work processes, inadequate work 
supervision, etc.  A model of the type being proposed here 
would be useful in identifying and anticipating conditions that 
can lead to reduced safety. 
For instance, the maintenance modeling and simulation 
example above can show how the quality and productivity of 
work affects safety and how their affect on safety depends on 
what the work is and what systems are involved.  Suppose work 
‘k’ is to perform preventive maintenance on a pump.  How 
productive the workers are and the quality their work will affect 
not only this pump, but pumps in safety equipment and in 
generation (and other) services.  Modeling and simulation 
would allow, for example, the assessment of changes in staffing 
that might lead to changes in reviewer acceptance criteria for 
work because pumps are delayed in being returned to service.  
Safety would be impacted by the number of times the work is 
accepted when it should not be, which is driven by the context 
of the work situation.  This is importantly different from human 
reliability analysis data that would simply say, on average, x% 
of review acceptances are ‘in error’. 
Once a model has been created and validated it is possible to 
undertake numerous “what if” studies to better understand the 
impact of human performance on the system safety.  Because of 
the explicit nature of the model one can trace the impact of 
policy changes.  For example, retirement of senior supervisors 
can lead to reduced maintenance productivity, which can lead to 
an increasing work order backlog, which can lead to 
management concern and increased meetings, which can then 
propagate into other sectors of the plant.  Thus, the model can 
be useful to decision makers by focusing on the human 
performance factors that impact work productivity and work 
quality in all sectors of the plant. 
It is also important to remember that a plant model is organic.  
As new ideas emerge about what types of factors may impact 
performance it is easy to add these ideas into the model.  Thus, 
there may be many factors that affect motivation of people.  
These ideas can be introduced into the model with out 
reworking the entire model.  Likewise, it is easy to remove 
factors that are not significant. 
V. INTEGRATING HUMAN PERFORMANCE
MEASURES WITH CURRENT INDUSTRY PRACTICES 
The research questions this modeling and simulation 
approach address are what can be inferred from measurable 
plant outcomes such as productivity, quality, and safety to 
human performance at nuclear power plants?  Additionally, can 
these outcomes be characterized by specific measures and then 
related to other measures that provide decision makers with 
advanced notification of declining human performance or 
degrading conditions?  If so, how?  More precisely let M = Set 
of plant outcome measures.  The challenge is then to develop a 
function F(X): X  M through modeling and simulation that 
correlates human performance with measurable plant outcomes.  
In broad terms the desired mapping could be as described in (4). 
The simulation of a model such as the ones described in this 
paper could establish the mapping of this function. The goal of 
such a function would be to provide an indication for additional 
actions such that potential problem areas are addressed prior to 
their manifestation into a reportable safety related event.  When 
a boundary condition is exceeded (i.e., a Yellow or Red 
condition), further investigation and follow-up actions may be 
warranted.  Under normal conditions (i.e., Green and White), 
follow-up investigations may not be necessary. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
It is recognized that the development and acceptance of 
performance measures is nontrivial.  They must be defendable 
and obtainable within the bounds of industry.  In addressing 
human performance assessment, Wreathall [7] has suggested 
that human performance measures should have the following 
characteristics:
x Objective: it should not be easily manipulable by plants 
or involve judgments that can be arbitrary. 
x Quantitative: this allows it to be trended and compared 
with other measures. 
x Available: if possible, additional measurements by 
plants should be avoided as an issue of efficiency. 
x Simple to understand/represent worthy goals/possess 
face validity: since plants will tend to ‘manage the 
measure’, having the measure represent a worthy goal 
will tend to improve performance in itself. 
x Related to/compatible with other programs: if possible, 
measures should be integrated into existing programs to 
affect efficiency as minimally as possible. 
These are examples of the standards to which individual or 
collective measures must be assessed, especially if such 
measures will be utilized as a basis for further diagnosis. 
The advantages of the modeling and simulation approach are 
numerous.  The framework for the approach was developed by 
the industry and the measures are to a large degree based on 
data already collected and even used in current business 
practices.  Thus, the information should be obtainable without 
significant burden to the utilities, the measures developed 
should be valid and reliable, and the approach should meld with 
the current measures of plant performance and thus is not a 
significant change in philosophy.  Additionally, this overall 
approach would provide industry with self-assessment measures 
and trending tools standardized across the industry that are 
specifically designed to assess human performance. 
There is a need to identify and assess aspects of human 
performance that relate to plant safety and to develop measures 
that can be used to help develop the technical bases for the 
development of human factors review criteria.  From the 
evidence presented in this paper, a technical basis for the 
development of measures of human performance exists through 
modeling and simulation approaches that use industry 
developed frameworks of organizational and human 
performance and existing human performance data from nuclear 
power plants. 
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